



*After the  
Comprehensive Peace Agreement  
in Sudan*

*Edited by*

ELKE GRAWERT

 JAMES CURREY

James Currey  
www.jamescurrey.com  
is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd  
PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DE, UK  
and of Boydell & Brewer Inc.  
668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620, USA  
www.boydellandbrewer.com

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First published 2010

1 2 3 4 5 14 13 12 11 10

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This publication is printed on acid-free paper

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

After the comprehensive peace agreement in Sudan. --

(Eastern Africa series)

1. Sudan--History--Civil War, 1983-2005--Peace.

I. Series II. Grawert, Elke.

327.1'72'09624-dc22

ISBN 978-1-84701-022-3 (James Currey Hardcover)

Typeset in 10/11 pt Baskerville  
by Tina Ranft, Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK  
Printed and bound in Great Britain  
by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham, Wiltshire

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
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## *Editor's Preface*

Five years after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of Sudan was signed in Nairobi in January 2005, several research-based assessments of the process of implementing the agreement and the prospects for lasting peace in Sudan are now available. This book compiles scholarly analyses of the implementation of the power sharing agreement of the CPA, of the ongoing conflicts with particular respect to land issues, of the challenges of the reintegration of internally displaced people and refugees, and of the repercussions of the CPA in other regions of Sudan as well as in neighbouring countries. Most of this research was conducted in the framework of a cooperative research project on 'Governance and Social Action in Sudan after the Peace Agreement of January 9, 2005: local, national and regional dimensions', which is part of the research programme 'Knowledge for Tomorrow: Political, Social and Economic Dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa' sponsored by the German Volkswagen Foundation. The project participants are senior and junior scholars and researchers from the University of Khartoum, University of Juba, Ahfad University for Women, Omdurman, the University of Addis Ababa, the University of Nairobi, and the University of Bremen. The papers assembled in this book were first presented during a workshop on 'After the CPA: Signs of Change?' with international participants at the Institute of World Economics and International Management of the University of Bremen in November 2006. They were submitted and updated in 2009.

On behalf of the authors of this book, the editor wants to thank first of all the Volkswagen Foundation, which sponsored research about various issues related to the CPA through scholarships for higher qualification at the Master's and PhD levels. The sponsorship also included workshops like the one at the University of Bremen in

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November 2006, where the researchers had the opportunity to discuss their findings with international experts in Sudan research, some of whom also submitted papers for this book. Last but not least, the Volkswagen Foundation contributed to this publication by taking over some of the production costs, together with the Bremen Society for Economic Research (Bremer Gesellschaft für Wirtschaftsforschung), to which we also submit our thanks.

We also owe respect and gratitude to Dr Douglas Johnson, who extensively commented on the papers in this book and helped the editor with detailed advice. In addition, we extend many thanks to Tino Urban and Jörg Wehrenberg, who committed much of their time to the technical editorial work.

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
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## *List of Acronyms*

ABC	Abyei Boundary Commission
ADP	Anuak Democratic Party
ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AEC	Assessment and Evaluation Committee
ARRA	Administration for Refugee Affairs
AU	African Union
CBO	Community-Based Organisation
CE	County Education Committee
COER	Colloquium of the Commission on Ethnic Relations
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DC	Developed Country
DCA	Danish Church Aid
DFG	Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
DICAC	Development Inter-Church Aid Commission
DOP	Declaration of Principles
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party
EDD	Empowered Deliberative Democracy
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
ESPA	Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement
GONU	Government of National Unity
GOS	Government of Sudan
GOSS	Government of Southern Sudan
GPDM	Gambella People's Democratic Movement
GPDUP	Gambella People's Democratic Unity Party
GPLM	Gambella People's Liberation Movement
GNRS	Gambella People's National Regional State
GPUDM	Gambella People's Unity Democratic Movement
HAC	Humanitarian Aid Commission
ICSS	Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person/People

*List of Acronyms*

IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
IRRI	International Refugee Rights Initiative
IRW	Islamic Relief Worldwide
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JIU	Joint Integrated Unit
JMC	Joint Monitoring Commission
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Services
KESSULO	Kenyan-Southern Sudanese Liaison Office
LDC	Least Developed Country
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MDP	Majangir Democratic Party
MDTF	Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MOEST	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
NCCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NCP	National Congress Party
NDA	National Democratic Alliance
NDP	Nuer Democratic Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NIF	National Islamic Front
NMPACT	Nuba Mountains Programme for Advancing Conflict Transformation
NRDP	Natural Resource Development Protection
NRF	National Redemption Front
NUP	National Unionist Party
OAG	Other Armed Groups
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCS	Officer Commanding Station
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan
PCP	Popular Congress Party
PDF	Peoples Defence Force
PTA	Parents and Teachers' Association
QUANGO	Quasi-Non-Governmental Organisation
RaDO	Rehabilitation and Development Organisation
RAMP	Riverine Arabised Muslim Power Bloc
RCT	Rational Choice Theory
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SANO	Sudan African National Organisation
SCC	Sudan Council of Churches

*List of Acronyms*

SCP	Sudanese Communist Party
SCS	Save the Children Sweden
SES	Socio-Economic Status
SIDO	Saharan International Development Organisation
SLM/A	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army
SMA	School Management Association
SMC	School Management Committee
SOE	Secretariat of Education
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SRRC	Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SSDF	South Sudan Democratic Forum
SSIM/A	South Sudan Independence Movement/Army
SSLM	Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
SSRC	Social Science Research Council
SSRRC	Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
TPLF	Tigrayan Peoples' Liberation Front
TTI	Teachers Training Institute
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UDSF	United Democratic Salvation Front
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
US	United States
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAP	Union of Sudanese African Parties
USCIRF	United States Commission on International Religious Freedom
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
USS	United States Ship
WFP	World Food Programme
WTI	Windle Trust International
ZOA	Refugee Care Netherlands







## *Introduction*

ELKE GRAWERT

After a long process of peace negotiations, which started only three years after the outbreak of the second civil war in Sudan in 1983, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed on January 9, 2005 between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The CPA raised initial hopes that it would be the foundation stone for lasting peace in Sudan. With its key protocols on wealth and power sharing (GOS/SPLM/A 2004, 2004a), it addresses two root causes of the civil wars in southern Sudan that had devastated the region from 1955 to 1972 and again, after eleven years of peace, from 1983 to 2004. These were economic marginalisation of the South and a near-exclusion of southerners from positions in government. The following introductory sections present the details of the CPA and outline the problems facing its implementation. Finally an overview of the sections and papers in this book is provided.

### Background and key issues of the CPA

The CPA officially and de facto ended the civil war in southern Sudan after a long process that had suffered many setbacks. It had started in 1986 with negotiations between factions of the formally democratic coalition government under Sadig el-Mahdi and the SPLM/A leadership. The coup d'état of 1989 by Lt. Omar Hassan el-Bashir, backed by the Muslim Brotherhood led by Hassan el-Turabi, was a heavy blow to a near-agreement. During the 1990s, negotiations intensified again under the umbrella of the Inter-governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), which includes the governments of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan. The CPA (GOS/SPLM/A 2005) is a compilation of protocols and agreements between the GOS and the SPLM/A, which includes the Machakos Protocol of July 20, 2002, the Agreement on

Security Arrangements of September 25, 2003, the Agreement on Wealth Sharing of January 7, 2004, the Protocol on Power Sharing of May 26, 2004, the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States of May 26, 2004, and the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area of May 26, 2004 (see documents in appendix of Adar et al. 2004; see also GOS/SPLM/A 2004b). This process came to a successful conclusion in January 2005. However, armed conflict escalated in eastern Sudan in 2005 and reached a precarious settlement through a peace agreement in 2006. Violent conflicts in Darfur, which had started soon after the famine of 1983–5, intensified as soon as the first agreements leading to the CPA were reached in 2003, and turned into a real war which has continued in spite of a partial peace agreement concluded in 2006 (see Grawert 2008; Woodward in this volume).

The CPA stipulates the transformation of political groups and movements into democratic parties (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 1.4.6). In the current process of implementation, which is scheduled for six years up to 2011, the interests of the former GOS are represented by the National Congress Party (NCP). This party is led by the Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir, who is part of an Arabised Muslim elite originating from the triangle between the Blue and White Nile with Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North as the centre of power. This ‘riverine Arab-Muslim Power Bloc’ (RAMP) (El-Battahani 2002) has dominated government in Sudan since independence, most of the time in terms of military rule, but with three short formally democratic intermezzi (1956–8, 1966–9, 1986–9). The SPLM is the civilian wing of the SPLA, which has been led by a southern Sudanese elite, largely consisting of Dinka, one of the largest ethnic groups in southern Sudan, since 1983. In the process of transforming this militant movement into a political party that strives for political legitimacy, the SPLM claims to represent the interests of all marginalised groups in Sudan (SPLM Economic Commission 2004: 57).

The successful part of the peace process is mainly due to one aspect of power sharing: the guarantee of the regional autonomy of southern Sudan. This includes the foundation of a regional Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 3.5), based on a secular regional constitution, with a SPLM-dominated Regional Assembly and Cabinet and the institution of the President of Southern Sudan (*ibid.*: 2.3.7), the establishment of an independent judiciary (*ibid.*: 3.6, 3.7), and the right of the population of southern Sudan to decide about independence through a referendum in 2011 (GOS/SPLM/A 2002: 2.5 and 2.10.1.5).

A further reason for peace between the government of Sudan and the SPLM/A is the proportionate inclusion of the SPLM in the national government of Sudan, with 28 per cent of the ministries and seats in the National Assembly. This government is now labelled Government of National Unity (GONU) and includes a 52 per cent majority of the NCP and 20 per cent drawn from several other northern and southern Sudanese

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parties (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 2.2.5). A Constitutional Court has been established in order to facilitate an independent judiciary (*ibid.*: 2.11.2.1). Moreover, local governments have been appointed in 26 federal states, ten of which are located in southern Sudan. According to the CPA, the members of the national, regional and state assemblies were supposed to be replaced by elected members following a nationwide ballot in 2009 (*ibid.*: 1.8.3). A further dimension of power sharing is civil service sector reform which is to ensure proportional occupation of higher positions by southerners (*ibid.*: 2.6.1.5 and 2.6.2). These arrangements for a more balanced political representation are an attempt to overcome the marginalisation of large parts of Sudanese society through institutional reform. The fair share of southern Sudanese personnel in leading positions is expected to create the potential to balance the vested interests of the old-established RAMP elite with those of the so far excluded parts of Sudanese society.

The CPA also stipulates devolution to states with their own constitutions that have to be compatible with the national and regional constitutions (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 4.4.4). Moreover, it includes a section on the repatriation, resettlement and reintegration of internally displaced persons (IDP) and refugees as well as the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the war-affected areas to which these groups return (GOS/SPLM/A 2002: 1.5.4).

The other crucial reason for the current absence of war in southern Sudan is the formula of wealth sharing. Accordingly, the GONU and the GOSS are each entitled to one half of the total oil revenues stemming from the southern Sudanese oil production, after deduction of 2 per cent for each oil-producing state in the South (GOS/SPLM/A 2004: 3.2, 5.5 and 5.6). The CPA also provides for determined development efforts in the war-torn South (Adar et al. 2004: 37–57). The agreement on the reallocation of revenues and enhanced economic investment in the South reflects the will of the signatories to achieve an equitable standard of living for the populations in northern and southern Sudan (GOS/SPLM/A 2004: 7.3). This has been backed by Western donor countries, which pledged US\$ 4.5 billion for two multi-donor trust funds, one at the national level and one for the South, established for development and infrastructural measures (Sudan Multidonor Trust Funds 2005). The southern fund is administered by the World Bank. The GONU and the GOSS are supposed to contribute a due share of oil revenues for development expenditures.

Another important aspect of wealth sharing is the regulation of control over land. The CPA stipulates that land commissions are to be established at national, regional and state levels in order to initiate a process that will amend and develop the relevant land laws towards the incorporation of customary laws and practices (GOS/SPLM/A 2004: 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7; GOS/SPLM/A 2004d: 9.3).

The CPA also provides steps towards the solution of particular problems in three critical areas on the boundary between northern and southern Sudan (GOS and SPLM/A 2004c, d). Part of these areas, the

Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordofan State and the southern part of Blue Nile State and the Abyei area, had been under SPLA control during the civil war. The CPA provides concrete formulae governing how rule over the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States is to be shared between the NCP and the SPLM until democratic elections are conducted. These elections were also scheduled for 2009 (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 1.8.3).

In the oil-rich contested area around Abyei, three different conflicts are overlapping. The first is about land claims between the Misseriya Arabs from the North and the Dinka Ngok from the South, both pastoralist peoples who compete for access to pasture and water in the area. The second conflict is about the political attachment of the area to either northern or southern Sudan within the framework of a general process of boundary demarcation between the two parts of Sudan stipulated in the CPA (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 3.1). Under colonial rule, the Abyei area had been incorporated into Kordofan, northern Sudan, for reasons of administrative convenience. During the two Sudanese civil wars, the area became a focus of fighting. Under the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement, which settled the first civil war in 1972, the residents of the area obtained the right to vote on whether they wanted to join the Southern Region. However, the GOS denied them this right, and this became one of the grievances that resulted in the second civil war. In the 1980s, Abyei came under SPLA control, which won recruits from the Dinka Ngok, whereas the Misseriya sided with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) as militias equipped by the GOS. The discovery of rich oil fields in Abyei has added a third conflict about the rights over this precious resource in terms of wealth sharing as part of the CPA. If Abyei is allocated to the South, 50 per cent of the oil revenues from the area will belong to the GOSS, but if it remains part of the North, it will not fall under the wealth sharing agreement, and these revenues will flow to the GONU.

The CPA dealt with the Abyei area in a careful way by declaring it a special area under direct control of the President until 2011. By that date the population of the area will have the right to decide whether they want to belong to the North or the South in a referendum linked to the general referendum in southern Sudan about independence or unity (GOS/SPLM/A 2004c: 8.1 and 8.2). In 2005, a special Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC), composed of representatives of the GONU and the GOSS and local leaders as well as independent experts, was established and given the task of demarcating the boundaries of the area based on the historical land allocation between the Misseriya and Dinka (*ibid.* 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3). However, after the ABC had delivered its report to the Presidency in mid-2005, the NCP and the SPLM failed to reach agreement about its consequences (Alemu 2006). It has turned into the main battlefield of ongoing violent conflicts after the CPA, carried out between the SPLA and the SAF, Misseriya and Dinka, as well as various militias, with numerous casualties. After an outbreak of real war in 2008, the NCP and the SPLM/A agreed to external mediation through the Permanent Court of

## *Introduction*

Arbitration. Its ruling in 2009 deviated from the suggestions of the ABC and was accepted by the two parties, but did not satisfy the Misseriya. Further fighting over Abyei looms ahead towards the time of the referendum.

A further important arrangement stipulated in the CPA is the restructuring of the military groups and forces according to a precise schedule. The SPLA fighters have to be re-trained so that they can operate as the regular regional army of southern Sudan. Militias ought to be integrated into either the SAF or the SPLA. Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) of the SAF and the SPLA should be deployed in the critical areas along the North-South boundary (GOS/SPLM/A 2003: 4). National, Regional and State Security Councils are to be established in order to supervise the implementation of the security regulations (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 2.7.2.1 and 2.7.2.5).

The implementation of the CPA is monitored by the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), based on a mandate of the UN Security Council (UN Resolution 1590 of 2005) for a period of six years up to 2011, the time of the referendum on the future of Sudan as a united or divided country. An important institutional set-up for the implementation is the formation of commissions dealing with the various aspects of the CPA such as the sharing of oil revenues (GOS/SPLM/A 2004: 3.2), allocation of land (*ibid.* 2.6 and 2.7), demarcation of the North-South boundary (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 3.1), clarification of the status of the Abyei area (*ibid.* 5.1), civil service sector reform (*ibid.* 2.6.1.5 and 2.6.2), the judicial service (*ibid.* 2.11.4.5), human rights (GOS/SPLM/A 2004: 2.10.1.2) and assessment of the implementation process itself (GOS/SPLM/A 2002: 2.4. and 2.4.1). The commissions are generally composed of both parties to the CPA plus independent experts. In particular, the assessment and evaluation commission, which monitors the implementation of the CPA, includes external forces, namely, government officials from Africa, Europe, and America.

## Successes and setbacks in implementing the CPA

Several steps have been taken to implement the agreements stipulated in the CPA. Others are still in the process and some are far behind schedule:

- In November 2005 the interim national constitution was issued, incorporating basic human rights, the basic rules for the formation of the transitional government and other requirements agreed upon in the CPA. The regional and state constitutions were therefore drafted during a controversial process between the main political parties. Positions in the GONU, GOSS and each of the 26 federal states were redistributed according to the Naivasha Protocol of 2004, one of the early documents on which the CPA was founded (GOS/SPLM/A

2004a). Accordingly, 52 per cent of the Cabinet posts and seats in the National Assembly were given to appointees of the NCP, 28 per cent to the SPLM, 14 per cent to other northern and 6 per cent to other southern forces. In the regional GOSS the proportions are 70 per cent for the SPLM, 15 per cent for the NCP and 15 per cent for other southern forces. In the 16 northern states the governments consist of 70 per cent NCP and 10 per cent SPLM, in the 10 southern states 70 per cent SPLM and 10 per cent NCP representatives, with 20 per cent filled by other southern and northern forces respectively, including former militias that are in the process of being transformed into political parties (ibid. 2.2.5 and 2.5.5). In the contested areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile States, the shares are NCP 55 per cent and SPLM 45 per cent, with governors changing between the two half-way through the term (GOS/SPLM/A 2004d: 11.1.5).

- In 2006, the Asmara Peace Agreement ended the violent conflict between the Beja Congress in eastern Sudan and the GONU. The Beja are pastoralists living in marginalised areas in southern Egypt, north-eastern Sudan and northern Eritrea, who formed a resistance movement in the 1960s and took up arms against the GOS in the 1990s. During their struggle for semi-autonomy of the eastern region, they repeatedly destroyed parts of the oil pipeline between South Sudan and the Red Sea harbour of Port Sudan. The political organisation of the Beja, the Beja Congress, joined the opposition National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and tried to become a partner in the peace negotiations between the GOS and the SPLM/A. When they failed, they allied with the Darfurian Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) in the struggle for federation. A partial peace agreement, the so-called Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), was concluded between the GONU and one faction of the Darfurian Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), but this sparked the split in the resistance movement in Darfur and led to an escalation of the war in western Sudan.

- The Boundary Technical Committee has not demarcated the North-South boundary as planned, but is still involved in a slow process of identifying the course of the boundary based on archival material from colonial times up to 1956 (Akol 2006).

- The national census, the basis for the establishment of constituencies for the elections at local, regional and national levels, was not conducted according to schedule in November 2007 (GOS/SPLM/A 2004a: 1.8.1 and 1.8.2) but delayed until the end of April 2008. The SPLM had the motivation to postpone the census until all the IDPs and refugees, who were still waiting in northern Sudan, had returned to the South. The party also demanded inclusion of the ethnic and religious

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identity of the population in the census form, with the intention of creating a statistical basis on which claims by the NCP that Muslims form the majority in the South could be verified or falsified. A further reason for the delay was the late release of funds by the GONU to the GOSS. Ultimately the census was conducted without more delay. The identity issues were not incorporated in the form. In some areas, such as Darfur and along the North-South boundary, the census could not be carried out properly because of armed conflict and contests between enumerators of the GONU and the GOSS about the allocation of the area to northern or southern Sudan (author's observation and interviews with members of the regional assembly in Juba, April 2008).

- The formation of commissions that are to deal with the key economic problems in Sudan – land and water rights and the redistribution of oil revenues – has also been delayed. This has led to a lack of transparency about the real national income from oil exports and hence the revenues to be re-allocated according to the CPA (see Kiir 2007). The delay has contributed to the failure to settle numerous mounting conflicts over land and water in many parts of Sudan, which were exacerbated by increased needs for land for the exploration of mineral resources and the mass return of IDPs and refugees.

- The redeployment of the SAF and SPLA troops has been conducted slowly. In the Nuba Mountains, violent conflicts between militias backed by the militant forces of each side continued until 2008. Deployment of the Joint Integrated Units was scheduled for October 2006, but up to the beginning of 2008 only 85.6 per cent of them had been formed, and clashes between the SAF and the SPLA were still occurring in Malakal in 2009. Security has remained precarious along the North-South border, where ongoing conflicts over land and water resources between pastoralists and cultivators and between oil companies and local inhabitants who have had to leave their land are also entrenched (UNMIS 2008).

The expected role of the SPLM members in the GONU and the National Assembly was to push forward the implementation of the peace agreement. However, the position of the SPLM at the national level has remained weak, so that it has not been able to insist on the timely fulfilment of the CPA. In addition to the objective disadvantages of being the junior partner in government, this also seems to be due to the slow process of restructuring the movement into a proper political party. There are also leadership weaknesses which have caused a partial neglect of the role of the SPLM at the national level in favour of concentrating party activities at the regional level of government (see Grawert/El-Battahani 2007).

In southern Sudan the SPLM has been struggling to gain power and control over its territory and the population. Political leaders have

concentrated their efforts primarily on achieving regional security. This has been reflected in the regional budgets of 2007 to 2009, in which the Regional Assembly earmarked nearly 40 per cent of the total budget for security, justice and law and order. The GOSS is under pressure to control underpaid soldiers who previously fought for the liberation army and still carry arms, and to disarm militias and various population groups who continue to carry guns from the time of the hostilities. Moreover, the fear of the current ceasefire failing is not far-fetched. Currently the SPLA has amassed troops near the North-South boundary, where there are also the SAF and militias of the NCP as well as the JIUs that should in fact be the only forces in that area according to the CPA.

This overview shows that it is still too early to claim success for the CPA. Tensions are still high in the North-South boundary areas. A solution of the key issues at stake – the attachment of the oil fields to northern or southern Sudan and an agreement about the territory which might come under southern Sudanese sovereign rule later on – is not in sight.

## Structure of the book

This book contains three main sections dealing with different processes taking place in Sudan and the sub-region, all of which relate to the CPA, plus a concluding chapter. It starts with the analysis of certain aspects of power sharing and a critical assessment of the way they are being implemented. The first section also includes critical assessments of the CPA and consideration of its inherent potential. The second section discusses controversial issues regarding the allocation of land, addresses a range of problems related to the return of IDPs and refugees, and analyses the current divisions and identity issues at stake in Sudan as well as amongst Sudanese refugees abroad. The third section looks into the implications of the civil war and the changes caused by the CPA in the sub-region. It also provides some material for comparative studies between decentralisation policies in Ethiopia and Sudan, between the CPA and the DPA, and between the relations of Ethiopia, Chad and Kenya with Sudan. The final chapter gives a theoretical background regarding certain aspects of the CPA and draws several theoretical conclusions from the issues discussed in the book.

### IMPLEMENTATION AND POTENTIAL OF THE CPA

In the first part of the book (Chapters 2–4), the process of implementing the CPA during the interim period is assessed under the two political perspectives of representation and participation. The focus of Chapters 2 and 3 is on the role of elites in conflict and peace processes in Sudan as well as in implementing the CPA. Chapter 4 concentrates on popular participation.

Melha Rout Biel traces the history of Arabisation and Islamisation in

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Sudan and the formation of the Arab-African divide in post-colonial Sudan. This history has been linked to a biased allocation of resources and development to the centre around Khartoum and the Blue and White Nile triangle, whilst other regions in the country were marginalised. This distorted development has led to the politicisation of ethnicity in numerous violent conflicts and to the long-lasting civil war. Against this background, the vision of the SPLM/A leader John Garang de Mabior (1983–2005) of a ‘New Sudan’ based on a democratic secular constitution and the sharing of power and wealth, as incorporated in the CPA, can be regarded as a roadmap towards integration of the society, based on a national concept of unity in diversity. The paper focuses on the role of elites in the resolution of the long political, military and social crisis in Sudan, showing that a new elite generation has been recruited from the political and military leaders of the regional resistance movements in southern Sudan and Darfur, from senior staff in Sudanese universities, and Sudanese graduates from Western universities. The military elite obtained the most influential positions of the SPLM/A in the GONU and the GOSS as well as in the state governments, as Biel illustrates with case studies of several high-ranking political personalities. Northern elites prevail in leading positions, as a compilation of the origins of senior political leaders since independence reveals, whereas at the level of the ministries and parliaments, higher representation of southerners can be claimed according to the CPA. Finally, Biel assesses alternative options for a peaceful solution in Sudan. He builds his scenarios on the judgement that the CPA, the DPA and the Asmara Agreement for eastern Sudan are signs of a recognition by part of the Sudanese elite of the need to compromise and to share power and resources. He considers this a first step towards more equality and justice as well as religious, cultural and political tolerance in Sudan.

Rania Hassan Ahmed looks into the realisation of the power sharing agreement with a focus on the fulfilment of the demand for fair representation of Sudanese society at the national level. Based on a statistical analysis of the composition of the National Assembly of the GONU, an overview of the history of the main political parties and an investigation of membership in parliamentary committees, she comes to the conclusion that there is still a bias towards the central region and interests stemming from that privileged part of the country. At the national level, the weight of a hardliner faction of the RAMP is reflected in policy decisions that have caused delays in the implementation of the power sharing agreement. In particular, the interest in securing control over the country’s key resources by certain dominant groups, which have been active in politics for a long time, explains these delays. She also identifies weaknesses of the two main parties, the NCP and SPLM, with regard to organisational structure, programmes, and internal power relations as causes of the lack of consistent policies towards the aims stipulated in the CPA. Within the NCP this weakness opens the door to the persistent influence of dominant groups of the RAMP elite. According to her

analysis, the SPLM, on the other hand, has preserved the cohesion of the liberation movement at the national level and is trying to increase its weight by winning support in those areas of the country where economic and political marginalisation and exploitation of key resources have alienated large population groups from the state. The transition from a liberation movement to a democratic political party has not been completed; hence structures are preserved that can form the organisational basis for a resumption of the civil war. The study shows that governance in Sudan is dominated by powerful individuals through control over the country's key resources rather than by fairly representative political leaders. This results in biased policies and delays in the implementation of the CPA.

Yasir Awad Abdalla Eltahir concentrates on political participation as the means by which Sudan's three structural problems, namely, uneven development, an inadequate political system and civil wars, could be solved. He focuses his study on particular definitions and understandings of participation in different parts of Sudanese society, most of which consider political participation as most meaningful outside the institutions of state and government. According to this research, in southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, and the eastern and northern regions, communities, which fought against the power structure of the old Sudan and its social order, applied a conflict model of political participation based on tribes, ethnic groups, and the SPLM/A. However, as Eltahir shows, the CPA is gradually extinguishing Sudan's inherently popular democratic elements by turning it into an elitist formally democratic system through the use of commissions and an emphasis on political representation by elites. He points out that, in contrast, political participation according to the local understanding will have the potential to tackle the three structural problems comprehensively, if popular participation is empowered towards a deliberative democracy.

With regard to the question of changes after the CPA, these three chapters paint a rather disappointing picture. Although the inclusion of southern Sudanese at the helm of government is a new development, the established RAMP elite apparently continues to have the centre of power and the key resources under its control at the national level. The activities of international NGOs and empowered community-based organisations (CBOs) with a local educated elite at the forefront are crucial to solving the numerous development problems occurring after the long war. However, these activities tend to subsidise and stabilise the current power relations rather than to challenge them. Albeit the CPA has been brought about by a struggle which triggered diverse forms of popular participation, the gradual institutionalisation of a liberal democratic system neglects the popular elements and focuses on an elitist system of political representation. This system may be more inclusive than the previous highly exclusive democracies in Sudan, but reveals characteristics that are likely to alienate the majority of Sudanese society from political involvement. The legitimacy of the emerging new political order is doubtful.

CHALLENGES FACING POST-WAR SOCIETIES IN SUDAN

The second part of the book (Chapters 5–10) analyses some of the challenges that have to be dealt with during the interim period after the CPA. A major challenge is to overcome the political divide in Sudanese society, which has even reached the community level. Reconstruction of a unified administration in Southern Kordofan State, which was partly under SPLM/A control and partly ruled by the GOS, requires the reconciliation of the former warring parties and their respective allies in the society on the ground. The tensions at the political level are closely linked to entrenched resource conflicts over land. Chapters 5 and 6 look into this issue from the perspectives of political science, gender studies, and social anthropology. The mass return of IDPs and refugees to the war-affected areas in the Nuba Mountains and southern Sudan poses another serious challenge to Sudanese society and the government. Chapters 7 and 8 study the socio-cultural repercussions of the return movement in the receiving communities. These include innovations and change triggered by the returnees, and the formation of an education system that can overcome the language divide in southern Sudan. Chapters 9 and 10 focus on Sudanese refugees in Kenya and the cultural and identity-related gaps that will have to be bridged if successful reintegration is to be achieved. Chapter 9 looks into the hybridisation and even corruption of culture under the conditions of a long-term stay in a refugee camp. The prevailing gender relations amongst southern Sudanese contain some entry points for the abuse of women, which put them in danger as soon as the traditional protection systems fail to operate. Chapter 10 points out that, beneath the surface of cultural clashes between returnees and resident population groups, there is often a struggle about access to resources, which aggravates reintegration.

Samson Samuel Wassara investigates the social, political and economic relationships prevailing in the Nuba Mountains after the war. He looks in particular into the relationship between the NCP and the SPLM and their role in reconciling the divided population, and gives an account of the role of aid agencies in this process. The study reveals that the divide between the Nuba, on the one hand, and the Baggara (cattle herding) and Shanabla (camel herding) peoples, on the other, that had been created by the GOS and SPLM/A during the civil war, has become even deeper since the ceasefire agreement was concluded in 2002, and has led to fatal violent clashes between these groups. Wassara links this divide to underlying causes in terms of conflicts over land. These had started in the 1960s due to the introduction of large-scale mechanised sorghum farming by the GOS, which allocated fertile land to merchants from the RAMP, the northern Sudanese commercial elite. Nuba and Baggara lost their previous rights over this land and its water sources and were forced to compete for the use of land and water in less fertile areas or make a poor living as agricultural labourers. Sorghum production had declined sharply during

the civil war and has now resumed along the same ethnicised pattern. The politicisation of ethnicity has made the previously loosely inter-connected Nuba groups acquire a pronounced ethnic identity and a tendency to acquaint themselves with the SPLM/A. The cross-over of some Baggara groups to the SPLM/A after the ceasefire agreement triggered intensive activities on the part of the NCP in Southern Kordofan to keep the pastoralists on their side. Arms supply fuelled violent conflict between the two groups along ethnic lines. Besides the inter-ethnic, intra-tribal conflicts escalated along the political divide within the Baggara/Shanabla and the Nuba societies.

Against this background, Wassara highlights the obstacles to implementing the special Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflicts in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States (GOS/SPLM/A 2004d). Mistrust between the Nuba and Baggara/Shanabla and between the NCP and SPLM/A led to delays in the appointment of ministers, members of the state assembly and, consequently, agreement on a constitution for the Southern Kordofan State. The politically motivated mistrust made a reunification of the two different administrative systems impossible. UNICEF assisted the two parties that were to form the state government in peace meetings which included community leaders, elders and local associations. The outcome was policy recommendations that were able to reinforce integration through inter-ethnic institutions working towards a solution of the land and resource conflicts, and the introduction of peace education in schools, with an outreach into the respective communities. However, the crucial issue of integrating the SAF and SPLA forces in JIUs in order to bridge the military divide in the area has not been completed. Small arms have proliferated in Southern Kordofan and have led to numerous fatal clashes between armed groups. These groups easily find new recruits amongst disappointed young IDPs who have waited in vain for a peace dividend in terms of meaningful socio-economic development in their home areas. Wassara comes to the conclusion that the competition between the NCP and the SPLM for political recruits has created political instability instead of a partnership for peace.

In an appendix to this paper, Tayseer El-Fatih Abdel A'al clarifies how aid-related civil society organisations are making decisions at the local level after the CPA. She looks into the approaches that have been undertaken to build a participatory inclusive democracy and establish the rule of law in Sudan. Decentralisation and the related changes in the local governance structures provide institutions with the potential to make decision-making processes more inclusive, so that the interests of the voiceless and marginalised groups may have an influence on public policies. With four examples of organisations in Dilling Locality in Southern Kordofan State, she identifies a substantial difference between the internal organisational structures and decision-making procedures in women's community organisations and those of international NGOs. Her study reveals that local educated women tend to have the control over decision-making in the

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community organisations, whereas, in international NGOs, decisions are made at the top level in the head offices abroad and in Khartoum, but based on information from staff in the field offices and other organisations working in the same programme sector and area.

Guma Kunda Komey shows, with an ethnographic case study, how the contest over land rights has acquired an ethnic dimension in the political context of the Nuba Mountains after the CPA. With a historical analysis grounded in archival and oral history research, he traces the social construction of 'region' as the basis for autochthonous, identity-focused claims to land rights. This research reveals how the Nuba peoples gradually adopted a common ethnic identity anchored in the region of the Nuba Mountains, which they constructed as their 'homeland'. Komey identifies the politics of government-induced land grabbing since the 1960s and then the displacement, forcible resettlement and ethnocide of the Nuba by the SAF and militias of the GOS during the 1980s as the root causes of the spread of the civil war from southern Sudan to the Nuba Mountains. The divide between Nuba, who largely affiliated with the SPLM/A, and the (agro-) pastoralist groups of the region who allied with the GOS, was reflected in two different administrative systems. The SPLM/A-controlled areas were inhabited by Nuba farmers, while in the GOS-controlled areas, from which many Nuba were evicted, groups claiming Arab origin predominated. This difference also pertained to land rights, which were based on customary ownership and user and access rights in the SPLM/A areas, and on the Land Act of 1970, which declares all communally used land to be government land, in the areas under the control of the GOS.

After the CPA and with the mass return of IDPs to the Nuba Mountains, the key resources of land, water, forest wood, horticultural development projects, and political power were strongly contested. Komey points out that, in the aftermath of the civil war, ethnic groups raised their demands on the government on the basis of their region as a political category. The politicisation of ethnic identities extends to the manipulation of the native administration and the mobilisation of the relevant institutions by groups close to the NCP in order to counteract the claims to 'regions' and their resources by the Nuba. Such claims tend to be fought out violently between these groups. Komey's thorough case analysis of the two contending groups of the Nuba of Leira and the Shawābna concerning the primary right to the Umm Derāfi area reveals that no objective judgement is possible about identity-driven claims. He shows that, in the absence of an appropriate solution, activities of humanitarian and development organisations as well as government institutions working in the separated areas have even consolidated divisive settlement patterns. Moreover, the Land Commission established in Southern Kordofan according to the CPA is not operating. Komey comes to the conclusion that the CPA is too vague on the crucial issue of land rights and he advocates the incorporation of customary land rights in the legislation.

Samira Musa Armin Damir studies the mass return of IDPs to the

Nuba Mountains, which comprised about 600,000 people between 2002 and 2009. Her paper concentrates on the interaction of the returnees with those population groups which had remained in the conflict areas. Land conflicts are a prominent pattern of this. Conflicts occur in Nuba agro-pastoralist communities, where returnees have found their land being seized by more powerful Nuba groups for settlement, farming or grazing. Violent conflicts also emerge between returnees and investors in mechanised schemes who had seized land from absent farmers during the war. Another source of conflict is the uncontrolled exploitation of resources such as timber, gum Arabic and palm trees by traders from central Sudan, who are backed by government officials and the SAF. Damir investigates how, according to the concept of cultural diffusion, ideas, life-styles, skills and knowledge are transmitted from the returnees to their home societies, and identifies innovations which the returnees bring to the Nuba Mountains based on skills and behaviour they acquired in the receiving areas of the IDPs. This has led to changes in the local livelihood systems, practices and concerns, and also in the ways different ethnic groups co-exist after the CPA.

The study reveals high expectations of socio-economic improvements due to the CPA. The restoration of peace and security in these areas, and the marginalisation of IDPs in the urban areas, where they faced inadequate employment opportunities, were the most important reasons for the return of IDPs. A significant number of returnees have been retired employees moving back to spend their old age in the region of their socio-political identification. Damir reveals that the elderly in particular tend to commit themselves to reactivating the local culture, traditions and customs in contrast to government-induced acculturation in the Arabised system in Khartoum. The younger returnees use ideas and practices they brought from their host communities regarding investment in agriculture, livestock production and small enterprises, thus contributing to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of material structures and institutions in the homeland. For many young people, political reasons are also a major factor in their return. They have mostly joined the SPLM. However, lack of socio-economic infrastructure and only marginal assistance in the re-establishment of households in the Nuba Mountains have caused a reverse migration to the urban areas in northern Sudan. Other groups have remained in the towns and support their returning family members with remittances. Damir comes to the conclusion that much still has to be done to secure a safe economic basis and social security for this society, which has to absorb such a large group of returnees.

Joseph Lodiong Lubajo analyses the challenges of the language policy in Jonglei and Upper Nile States in southern Sudan as part of the new educational policy of the GOSS. This policy aims at improving school enrolment and retention and the quality of education, reconstruction of schools, girls' education, education for peace, support of destitute children, child protection, and treatment of traumatised war-affected children. At the adult educational level, it aims to establish literacy programmes for

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SPLA soldiers and adults in southern Sudan, vocational training centres for out-of-school young people and demobilised soldiers, and teacher training institutes. Private organisations are to contribute to this educational system, together with the GOSS.

Lubajo traces the language policies in southern Sudan since colonialism when English was introduced as the language of instruction in primary schools. He shows that, even during colonialism, Arabic was used as the language of instruction in government schools in towns such as Malakal in Upper Nile State, where a significant number of officers and traders from northern Sudan used to live. After the first civil war, education had declined to the level of an estimated 10 per cent of the population of southern Sudan ever having gone to school. During the second civil war, in the GOS-held areas, Arabic was introduced as the language of instruction, whereas in the SPLM/A-controlled areas there was virtually no educational service. As a result, the younger teachers and the pupils in southern Sudan adopted Arabic as their second language in addition to their mother tongue. The policy of Arabisation was enhanced in 1989 after the coup d'état of Omar el-Bashir, when all schools in Sudan were required to teach in Arabic. At the time of the conclusion of the CPA, Arabisation of the South was at its height, but 91 per cent of girls and 72 per cent of boys in southern Sudan did not go to school. In the SPLM/A-held areas, UNICEF and NGOs provided rudimentary educational services starting from 2002, complementing the emerging educational system of the SPLM/A. Lubajo points out that this system was authoritarian, male-dominated and mostly run by ex-combatants without any teaching experience.

After the CPA, the GOSS created a regional Ministry of Education as well as ministries in each of the ten states in southern Sudan. The new government re-emphasises southern Sudanese identities, cultures, religions and languages as a continuation of the resistance to the Arabisation and Islamisation policy of the GOS during the civil war. Partly in support of the GOSS, but partly with their own agendas, UN agencies, international NGOs, Da'awa Islamiya and the Sudan Council of Churches are now engaged in developing primary education in southern Sudan. According to Lubajo, the main challenges facing the new educational programme of the GOSS are to upgrade the quality of teachers, to train teachers to use English as the language of instruction, and to integrate the masses of children returning from different areas of refuge with different languages of instruction and curricula into the southern Sudanese school system.

Marilyn Ossome focuses her paper on the situation of southern Sudanese girls and young women in the Kakuma Refugee Camp in Kenya. She points out that refugees in camps survive in a cultural vacuum, or at least under conditions where they try to uphold rudiments of their own culture against a cultural onslaught from Western or local cultures from the inhabitants of surrounding different cultural and social backgrounds. This leads to hybrid cultures, with a great probability of the abuse of practices which are considered as 'traditional'. Ways of life and culturally conferred

rights and obligations of Sudanese girls and women change significantly in the camp situation. Forced and early marriages, physical and, in particular, sexual violence, abductions, and forced confinement are frequent and have to be considered as manifestations of the process of cultural hybridisation.

Ossome compares the gender relations in Dinka and Nuer communities with those in the camp. She stresses that, in Nilotic communities, the involvement of the extended family and community elders in the marriage process is an effective support mechanism that encourages husbands and wives to work out problems in constructive ways. However, a very low literacy rate amongst women and the poverty of parents facilitate early, and therefore often forced, marriages in southern Sudan. Parents may need the bride wealth for survival and justify the out-marriage of a young daughter with her protection by a male guardian and avoidance of extra-marital pregnancy. In contrast, in the refugee camp forced marriage is considered to be 'a cultural aberration' that occurs because norms and checks are absent in the camp. Most of the bridegrooms involved in forced marriages are the so-called 'lost boys', who had escaped the war by walking across the border to Ethiopia and, after the Ethiopian regime change in 1991, to Kenya and were then resettled in the USA. After the CPA, many of them came to the Kakuma Refugee Camp in order to find a virgin to marry, and offering an extremely high bride wealth to her parents. In many cases the girl and even her mother are not included in the negotiation. During the period of waiting for finalisation of the resettlement procedures, the girls are kept in places away from their relatives and are frequently sexually abused by their guards. If a girl gets pregnant under these circumstances, she will be rejected on all sides including by her own family, who will have to repay the dowry, because abduction of girls is considered to be a failure of the protective role of the kinship system. It frequently occurs, because young men living in the refugee camp cannot compete with the bride wealth the 'lost boys' can afford. According to Ossome, the response of camp institutions, including the UN agencies and international NGOs, the local police, the judiciary, and the community bench courts, to these human rights violations is inadequate. She comes to the conclusion that this collusion between the community, the law enforcers and the aid agencies makes the life of refugee women and children highly insecure and dangerous. The rationalisation of these practices as 'culture' is an attempt to avoid a policy revision towards refugee protection.

Obaka Otieno John contrasts the state-centric policies of repatriation, reintegration and resettlement of refugees that are based on the concept of individual citizenship, with indigenous concepts of belonging to collectivities. He holds that flight during childhood or being born in a refugee camp can lead to the loss of the latter type of identity, and shows that this causes much more serious problems for the reintegration of refugees in their areas of origin than the question of citizenship. The main reason is that, in contrast to ethnic belonging, the category of citizenship is a social construct that does not necessarily entitle a returning refugee to access to or control of resources.

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As John reveals, there are more subtle components of reintegration than those stressed in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the state-organised process of repatriation. These refer to politics of acceptance, identity and belonging for those whose social identities have been situational and in flux during flight, return and reintegration.

Against this background, John uses a rational choice approach to investigate the perception of the benefits and costs of return and reintegration according to various identities. He finds that access to social and cultural belonging in the refugees' home communities has a high priority for the returnees, because it also determines access to the social values and resources in the homelands. This implies that some refugees do not return because of the difficult access to the identity possessed by the receiving population and the tensions arising in the attempts to re-establish these connections. John points out that hostility tends to occur, because the resident population tries to defend its scarce resources from perceived or real threats arising from the claims of the returnees. The refugees in turn will adopt varying reactions, if they are denied access to certain closed identities, including getting involved in violent clashes over access rights to land. Those who cannot cope with the shift in identity from being a refugee to being a member of an ethnically defined community, which is required for reintegration, resort to a second displacement. They will either go back to the country of refuge, even back to the camp, or to any other location, such as the suburbs of southern Sudanese towns. A main reason to stay away from home is the access to education abroad.

John argues that the lack of attention by state-centric organisations to the identity issues of reintegration has led to the lack of preparedness for clashes arising over claims to ownership in the areas to which the refugees return. He suggests that a formula for merging local components of national/formal or state-ascribed citizenship with other potentially existing identities, which people use in defending their rights, could lead to a more constructive way of reintegration. He makes it clear that the priority of the Sudanese returnees in the wake of the CPA is not the right to vote, but the right to survive, to earn a living, to have access to education, health care and housing. Access to these bases of livelihood in the form of 'belonging' to a particular community should be considered as a human right that needs to be protected.

All the papers in this section provide evidence of the deep socio-economic, political, cultural and even linguistic divisions, which have to be overcome if peace in Sudan is to become sustainable. Resistance to Arabisation amongst the Nuba and peoples in southern Sudan is expressed by a new emphasis on indigenous culture. However, this is no longer the old village culture. Its expression is influenced by the returnees' experiences with either the dominant northern Sudanese culture or the cultures in neighbouring countries. Another form of opposition to the dominant system occurs in the political realm by strengthening the SPLM, the party representing the struggle against marginalisation during the civil war. With regard to the new conflicts in the Nuba Mountains after the CPA, two

developments have been revealed. On the one hand, the polarisation and politicisation along ethnic lines, that had already occurred during the civil war, have been enhanced by attempts of the SPLM/A to mobilise the Nuba, whereas the NCP recruits support from Baggara and settlers of West African origin. On the other hand, these new conflicts divert attention from the Arab-African divide and also take on intra-ethnic features. This can be traced to the realignments of communities on ethnic and political grounds as a consequence of the persistence of parallel institutions in the former GOS- and SPLA-controlled areas. The mass return of IDPs and refugees has complicated the re-formation of communities, in particular because of contested access to land. The frequent attempts of some groups to drive out other ethnic groups under the pretext of land ownership along ethnic and political divides provide evidence of the urgency of establishing a functioning Land Commission in Southern Kordofan State as stipulated in the CPA.

With regard to the linguistic divide in southern Sudan, the new educational policy of the GOSS is a bold attempt to unify the society in the long run by introducing English as a consistent language of instruction in schools. At the same time, the ethnic diversity that is expressed in different languages is incorporated in the curriculum through courses in those languages that prevail in the respective states. Currently, the return of IDPs and refugee children, who were taught in different languages according to their areas of refuge, adds to the chaos in the educational system, which is already struggling with the Arabic-English divide. The language aspect of the reintegration of IDPs and refugees requires more attention and assistance for the educational sector than was anticipated by the partners formulating the CPA.

The reintegration of refugees poses additional challenges to the already difficult situation in southern Sudanese society. This process may fail and lead to a large diaspora, which may be useful in terms of supporting their families through remittances and funding part of the reconstruction of southern Sudan. This would be the outcome, if the current identity division between refugees and the resident communities is maintained and deepened. A second option is that the refugees integrate into the fast-growing towns in southern Sudan, where they can live in a way that reconciles their refugee and home identities. A third option is that they return to their homelands. In this case, the dangers of an adverse type of cultural hybridisation, which victimises women in particular, have to be avoided. This requires a careful policy towards regulating bride wealth customs, promoting education and professional training of girls in order to raise the average age of marriage, and increasing awareness in the society about the rights of women to self-determination.

#### THE CPA IN ITS SUB-REGIONAL CONTEXT

The third section in this book (Chapters 11–14) investigates sub-regional repercussions of the CPA with examples of Gambella/Ethiopia,

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Darfur/western Sudan, Chad and Kenya. Chapter 11 provides a historical in-depth analysis of the multiple conflicts in the Gambella region and their relations with the civil war in southern Sudan. It discloses why conflicts have continued, whilst, at the same time, peaceful economic relations have been established between Sudan and Ethiopia after the CPA. Chapter 12 analyses the impact of the introduction of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia on conflicts between ethnic groups in the Gambella region. It shows that ethnic representation has led to increased competition for power positions and related resources, and fuelled conflict rather than settled it. It concludes with the advice that this model should not be replicated in Sudan. Chapter 13 explores the connections between the CPA and the Darfur conflict. It discusses the context which made the successful signing of the CPA possible, and compares this constellation with the conditions under which the DPA was signed. The major reasons why the DPA failed were that many more partners had to be involved because of splits in the Darfurian resistance movements, and a changed international environment. Chapter 14 presents the sub-regional and international actors and institutions that were involved in the Sudanese peace process leading up to the CPA. It analyses the relations of northern and southern Sudan with the neighbouring countries during the war and studies the changes that occurred in the aftermath of the CPA. Finally it assesses the dangers for sub-regional peace, if a renewed international effort to push for the timely implementation of the CPA is not made.

Regassa Bayissa Sima shows how the interrelations between the different ethnic groups living on both sides of the border between Sudan and Ethiopia have developed in history. His focus is on Gambella in southern Ethiopia, which shares two major population groups, the Nuer and Anuak, with Sudan. The border area was intensively affected by the two civil wars in Sudan, throughout which refugees and insurgents entered the Gambella region from Upper Nile and Jonglei States. A significant number of Nuer settled in the region, and in the 1980s Sudanese refugees outnumbered the local population. Sima states that deforestation and eradication of game as well as new social, economic, political and cultural conflicts were some of the consequences of the mass influx of refugees and the erection of large refugee camps. Growing access to small arms due to the intensified civil war in Sudan and the political and military alliance between the SPLM/A and the Ethiopian military government (the Derg) led to a militarisation of the Nuer groups in Gambella, which forcibly occupied areas previously used by Anuak. In response, violent conflicts between the two groups occurred more and more frequently.

In addition, the resettlement programme of the Derg in the 1980s brought a significant number of other ethnic groups from all over Ethiopia to Gambella. 'Highlanders' from northern and southern Ethiopia as well as Nuer dominated the local administration up to 1991, when the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)

took over power in Addis Ababa. In 1995 Gambella became an administrative unit of its own, the Gambella People's National Regional State (GPNRS), with proportionate representation of its ethnic groups in the government. Sima points out that this turned the conflict over economic resources between the Nuer and Anuak into a conflict about political control over territories in terms of administrative units and financial government resources. Armed Anuak extended their fight to the refugee camps and indiscriminate killings of highlanders in the early 2000s, one of the reasons being that the Anuak population had become a minority in the region, with the consequence that their access to educational and other services as well as economic resources declined. The majority of the Sudanese refugees were repatriated up to 2008.

Sima also looks into economic change after the CPA. On the one hand, trade on the Baro river has resumed between Gambella and Nasir and Malakal in Sudan. On the other hand, cattle raids increased tremendously in southern Sudan, and cattle rustling and even killings again crossed the border into Gambella. The poor integration of militias into the SAF or SPLA, the failure of the GOSS to exert effective and full control in the region, and the easy availability of small arms in the Gambella region following the disarmament of Sudanese militias by the SPLA have added to this tense situation. A promising perspective has opened up, however, with new cooperation between the SPLM/A officials of Upper Nile and Jonglei States and those of Gambella Regional State in order to settle the conflicts along the border.

Monika M. Sommer analyses the conflicts in Gambella from the perspective of political science and law. She sets them in the framework of the Ethiopian political system of ethnic federalism and investigates how this system performs with regard to conflict resolution. The Ethiopian system aims to strengthen the formerly marginalised ethnic groups in the country through proportional representation in regional state governments and the constitutional right to form political parties. The central government maintains the ultimate control over economic resources including land, but it delegates decisions about the details of land use to the regional states and provides them with considerable economic freedom in terms of raising their own taxes.

Turning to the case of Gambella, Sommer shows that, in the GPNRS, five major ethnic groups are represented proportionally in the government, but the highlanders have been excluded from representation, although they currently amount to nearly one quarter of the population. This constitutional exclusion from political rights has created frictions. After 1991, several ethnic-based parties, which derived their strength mainly from good relations with the national ruling party coalition of the EPRDF, were formed in Gambella, but they soon dissolved again. In 2002 the Gambella People's Democratic Movement (GPDM) was formed, an umbrella party composed of the main ethnic groups of the region which, however, administered each ethnic group separately. According to

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Sommer, this peculiar system was a response to the severe ethnic clashes that took place during that year against the background that ethnic belonging had been made a criterion for access to power, participation, material resources and education. She shows that 'conflict settlement' in Gambella was dominated by the central government, which also controlled the process of political reorganisation in the aftermath of this conflict. In 2007, all parties, including the GPDM, were abolished, and a uniform party was established, the Gambella Peoples' Unity Democratic Movement, which has the declared aim of improving relations with the EPRDF in order to gain better and direct access to resources. The regional government of Gambella also formed a Council of Elders, attached to the Regional Council and consisting of well-respected ethnic leaders. This new structure, which is composed of reformed traditional and modern institutions, has the purpose of finally settling the conflicts between ethnic groups.

Regarding the suitability of ethnic federalism as a model for other countries including Sudan, Sommer comes to the conclusion that a constitution with the potential for power sharing and effective redistribution will not be sufficient if there is a centralised party structure in place, which bypasses the constitutional right to regional self-determination. However, ethnic federalism may lead to more inclusiveness, as in the case of Ethiopia, where local elites participate in politics more than ever before and have the opportunity to adapt constitutional forms of conflict resolution to local needs. The Ethiopian form of federalism is thus not a model that should be replicated in other countries, but it might be a useful starting point for deliberations about the appropriate form of a decentralised system of government, for example in southern Sudan.

Peter Woodward analyses the CPA and the DPA and looks into the reasons why the CPA still obtains more than five years after its conclusion, whereas the DPA failed immediately after it was signed. He shows that two important national factors had made the CPA possible. The first was that, at the turn of the century, it was obvious that neither the SAF nor the SPLA could gain the military upper hand in the war. The second was the fact that the power base of the NCP had dwindled, so that it relied mainly on the National Intelligence Service of Sudan (NISS). The SPLM/A was under pressure, because it had to fight not only against the SAF but also against strong NCP-backed southern militias, as well as internal tensions. According to Woodward, an agreement on ending the war was a win-win situation for both warring parties at that time. The NCP hoped to regain strength based on improved legitimacy after signing a peace agreement, and the SPLM/A intended to make use of the opportunity to extend its constituency to the marginalised areas of the North. A third reason was that both parties had an enhanced interest in gaining access to the revenues from oil, land and water, resources which could not be exploited fully in a war environment. At the sub-regional level, a shift in the orientation of the IGAD from purely development-related cooperation towards a stronger

political role, in particular directed towards the resolution of the conflicts in its member states, contributed to the ultimate signing of the CPA. Lastly, the international community, in particular the United States, began to support the peace process, based on a deal which implied that the NCP would stay away from involvement in terrorist plots and lend the NISS to assist the US in its 'war on terrorism', and the US would back Kenya in hosting the final peace negotiations.

Woodward argues that the DPA, on the other hand, could not build on a long-term process of confidence-building between the negotiating partners like the CPA. Although the conflict, which escalated to unforeseen violence in 2003, can be traced back to the 1980s, peace negotiations started only in 2005. The NCP did not treat the resistance movement as an equal partner as it had done with the SPLM/A, but considered its representatives to be 'rebels'. Under these conditions, moves towards compromises between the NCP and certain representatives of the Darfurian resistance movement were seen by others as giving in on unequal terms. This contributed to splits and the establishment of ever more factions in the movement, further aggravating the negotiations. Impatient pressures and deadlines set by the representatives of the British and US governments had the effect that, in 2006, the DPA was signed by only one faction of one resistance group, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), and the GONU, whereas the other factions and resistance groups refused to sign the agreement under pressure. This failure to settle the Darfur conflict was immediately reflected in the escalation of the war.

Woodward makes it clear that there was no military deadlock nor any mutual political interest in peace as there was in the context of the CPA. Moreover, the sub-regional and international governments were sharply divided about the response to the ongoing hostilities. In particular, the Chadian government, which was under internal pressure, blamed the NCP for backing its enemies, thus justifying its own siding with part of the Darfurian resistance movement. Since the NCP cooperates economically and militarily with China and Russia, no agreement was possible in the UN Security Council, as had been the case with the UNMIS in the CPA. After a rather long process, an AU/UN hybrid force was agreed on. Woodward states that the DPA polarised Sudan as a whole and strengthened the secessionist tendencies in the south and west. The DPA process, the escalating war in Darfur, and the involvement of NCP-backed militias distracted the attention of the international community from the implementation of the CPA. Woodward concludes that power sharing has to be made more inclusive to achieve peace in Sudan. This requires the NCP to loosen its grip on the centres of power. Otherwise, more violence is expected to be the inevitable consequence.

Elke Grawert investigates the implications of the civil wars and the peace process in Sudan from a sub-regional perspective and elaborates on the challenges for the institutions that had been involved in the CPA. She

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highlights three main factors, which shaped the political spaces in the sub-region around Sudan after independence, namely, militant movements fighting for secession or autonomy and their political bases in exile, ambitious economic programmes involving international cooperation, and the strategic interests of the political and economic superpowers. With the end of the Cold War and the downfall of the Ethiopian military government in 1991, the sub-regional military and political spaces changed. The SPLA shifted its military operations from Ethiopia to Darfur and eastern Sudan. The importance of Kenya grew considerably, since it provided the primary political basis for the SPLM/A and the logistical basis for international humanitarian agencies operating in southern Sudan, and because its government became the key mediator between the GOS and the SPLM/A. The final phase of negotiating the CPA triggered new conflicts between armed opposition groups and the SAF in northern, eastern, and western Sudan.

Grawert analyses, in particular, the relations between Sudan and Chad. She identifies an economic space, where international competition for mineral resources is taking place and the strategic interests of the sub-regional powers are involved. Local and sub-regional resource conflicts about land and water have added to this and made the Sudanese-Chadian border a hotbed of violence. The long-term militarisation of both the Sudanese and Chadian societies contributed to the easy mobilisation of militias by the respective governments against resistance movements. The movements in Darfur took up arms when they realised that voicing their claims violently had been one of the key conditions for the SPLM/A to be taken seriously in the peace negotiations for the CPA. However, the CPA increased the hostilities amongst the fighting groups in Darfur and weakened the movement for political inclusion and development there. This failure in turn strengthened the uncompromising position of the NCP faction in the GONU, which managed to distract international attention from the CPA to Darfur and delayed the implementation of the CPA. Grawert points out that quite a different development has taken place in southern Sudan after the CPA. The GOSS signed economic cooperation contracts with Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya, and numerous investors from these countries as well as from northern Sudan and various Asian and European countries have used the peace for construction, business and oil exploration ventures. But the CPA has also enhanced the small arms market in the sub-region. In the case of Kenya this has led to the escalation of internal conflicts.

Finally Grawert assesses the roles of sub-regional and international actors in monitoring CPA implementation in the sub-region. The IGAD has not taken over any further responsibility for the CPA, because of internal preoccupations of the Kenyan government, which chairs its proceedings, and the GONU insistence that the Darfur conflict is an internal affair. The international community has left the task of monitoring the CPA to the UNMIS, which has a limited mandate in terms

of Chapter 6. Meanwhile, spaces have emerged where the untransparent and unmonitored activities of militias, the SAF and the SPLA are taking place in the contested boundary areas between northern and southern Sudan. A new outbreak of civil war between the SPLM/A and the SAF is considered as likely to spread to several regions in northern Sudan and affect the sub-region of North-East Africa much worse than before. A perspective with a potential for sustainable peace could be an enhanced development process in the border areas around Sudan, based on both oil revenues and coordinated development assistance, and making use of the existing economic spaces that livelihood networks of ethnic groups have already created across borders.

The papers in this section reveal that the CPA cannot be considered as a national affair of Sudan. It has implications for the neighbouring countries that had also been seriously affected by the civil war, and it has regional implications in other parts of Sudan, as has been outlined in the case of the DPA. The CPA, the DPA, and the Asmara Agreement include aspects of power and wealth sharing and thus an element of including marginalised parts of society in Sudan's power system. They have the potential to make the CPA more comprehensive. In the case of the failure of the DPA, the implications were enforced secessionist tendencies in Darfur as well as in southern Sudan and a mounting conflict between the governments of Sudan and Chad. At the same time, the CPA improved the relationship between the GONU, Ethiopia and Kenya, and in particular the economic and political relations between these two countries, the GOSS, and Uganda. In order to sustain a peaceful environment within which the long-absent development of southern Sudan can flourish, the implementation of the CPA has to move on, and it should be in the interests of the whole sub-region and the international investors that this is ensured. Such a development requires these powers to share the responsibility of keeping the former warring parties on track to implement their agreement fully.

BEYOND THE CPA:  
THEORETICAL OUTCOMES AND PRACTICAL  
CONSIDERATIONS

The last chapter in this book reviews those aspects of consociational democratic theory and theories of devolution that have been incorporated in the CPA. Besides the positive outcomes in terms of fair representation and extended political participation, the chapter also presents the flaws and possible adverse results as they have been discussed by political scientists. It continues with some consideration of the concepts of elite and mass political culture and relates them critically to Sudanese society. This section also includes the discussion of potential entry points for deliberative democracy.

In a second part, the theoretical aspects of constructing identities are highlighted and conclusions are drawn for the divisions facing Sudanese

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society. This part deals with three perspectives of identity analysis. The first is identity formation through government policies according to particular power interests and strategic considerations, such as the policy of Arabisation and Islamisation in Sudan, or the new language policy in southern Sudan. The second is the grassroots perspective, which interlinks the construction of identity with regions, territories or homelands, dynamic concepts that are loaded with history, culture, religion, social relations, resources and economic interactions. The third perspective is the identity dilemma of refugees who try to reintegrate into their communities of origin and have to bridge several social, economic, cultural and political divides. For a policy of reintegration this means that it has to address the adverse impacts of corrupted or hybrid cultures on certain population groups, mainly young women and children. The last part of the chapter presents the theoretical concept of 'spaces' as a useful approach to explain the way sub-regions emerge and the dynamics that shape and re-shape them. It then turns again to the CPA and discusses its flaws and potential in the light of a sub-regional approach.

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