

Ten Lessons Learned from the Addis Ababa Agreement- The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, Nairobi, January 9, 2005 and Sustainable Development

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1. A major element for a development strategy in the South of the Sudan was to start and to establish a strong and effective administration. It was for this reason that the establishment of an Institute of Public Administration was recommended in order to train cadres for all levels of government. The Institute was meant to have independent experts to give advice on the public organization and the methods, and to determine the course for an efficient functioning of government. This has not been realized until now.
2. Eventually, the decentralized political system did not drip deeper from the region to the province and to the village levels – due to lack of trained personnel. As a result, the system crystallized into a centralized entity in Juba. There was no popular participation and the majority tribe, the ethnic group of the Dinka, ruled from Juba without a participatory base – later on this led to conflicts among the Southern tribes themselves.
3. There was no transitional period to build the required capacities with regard of the infrastructure for development and services. Training for vocational trades, at the lower and the middle levels of the available human resources, was neglected; instead funds were used to send scholars to famous British and American universities to acquire PhD. degrees. Most of these scholars did not return and are working abroad now.
4. The majority of the highly trained civil servants were gradually absorbed into political posts that gradually deprived the civil service from its qualified cadre and its leadership.
5. Labour-intensive public works projects were considered as an important part of a strategy for the development of the rural South. Nevertheless, there was no political enthusiasm for such grass roots development projects. This lead eventually to a concentration of the population and of the resources in few regional and provincial capitals.
6. There was no separation between the development budget allocation and the administrative state budget. As a result, the resources for development started to

become scarce due the fact that much of the available funds were used for bureaucracy and emergency needs.

7. No prioritisation was guiding the administration of the South. For example, development of the river transport and the railways systems – for the transport of products from and to the South and to the other Sudanese, regional and foreign markets – was not given the proper attention they deserved.
8. There was no proper accounting and auditing system for financial control. Moreover, lack of transparency led in several instances to corruption and fraud.
9. Development projects, especially those financed by grants and by aid from abroad, were not sustained when funds stopped coming in – this was due to a severe lack of good planning and of good financial administration.
10. Due to a rapid turnover of regional ministers and changes in the leadership of the Higher Executive Council for Southern Sudan, there was no continuity and uniformity, and moreover, the leadership was not firmly established.

Statement

**By K. Wohlmuth, Professor of Comparative Economics,
And Head of the Sudan Economy Research Group, University of Bremen, Germany**

This list of lessons to be learned from the Addis Ababa Agreement by Mister Murtada is presented to an international readership as Mister Mohamed El-Murtada Mustapha as a former high-ranking official of the Sudanese Government is well aware of the opportunities of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement but also of the dangers that the lessons from the experiences with the Addis Ababa Agreement are not learned quickly enough. We had interesting talks about these important issues in September 2005 in Khartoum at times of the inaugural workshop on the research project “Governance and Social Action in Sudan after the Peace Agreement of January 9, 2005”, and I found that it is important to present these ten lessons along with a link to the documents on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, January 9, 2005 at Nairobi (as made available on the homepage of the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa) at the homepage of IWIM (Institute for World Economics and International Management, University of Bremen, Germany).

See the link on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, January 9, 2005, Nairobi:

<http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Sudan/darfur/compax/>